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Abstract If loan issue falls faster than repayments, money becomes increasingly 
scarce, leading to deflationary pressures and unemployment. Central banks have re-
sponded by ‘quantitative easing’, a regressive form of money printing which buys off the 
national debt. Such credit could instead finance green infrastructure, health and social 
care, a basic income, and debt relief. Fiscal policy expansion which is not monetised, 
in contrast, results in crowding out. Given the ecological crisis caused by greenhouse 
emissions, the aim ought not to be resumption of business as usual. A social-ecologi-
cal response to the crisis would deploy a mixture of public credit creation deployed in 
prioritised sectors, progressive taxation, and direct curbs on greenhouse emissions.
Keywords Great Depression. Climate change. Unemployment. Central Bank. Quan-
titative Easing. Fiscal policy.
Summary 1 Introduction. – 2 Why Fiscal Stimulus cannot be Financed by Bond 
Issues. – 3 Why Debt Monetisation Should not be Done by QE. – 4 Why We Do not Simply 
Need ‘Recovery’ of the Previous Economy. – 5 A Post-COVID Social Ecological Policy 
Package. – 6 Conclusions.
1 Introduction
If one asks the general public who creates the money supply, the majority re-
sponse is invariably the government, via the central bank. This is emphat-
ically not the central bank’s understanding, however. As Sir Mervyn King 
said in 2012, then governor of the Bank of England (hereafter “The Bank”): 
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When banks extend loans to their customers, they create money 
by crediting their customers’ accounts […] a damaged banking sys-
tem means that today’s banks are not creating enough money. We 
have to do it for them. […] Insufficient money creation can lead to 
a contraction of the money supply and a depression.1
The governor was talking in the aftermath of the 2008 global finan-
cial crisis, and referring to Quantitative Easing (QE), rather than 
printing notes and coin. In fact, only 3% of the UK money supply is 
created as notes and coin in circulation in the modern era, and 97% 
is virtual credit, ordinarily supplied as private bank loans. The cri-
sis in the wake of COVID-19 is estimated to be greater than that of 
2008, with severe and immediate impact on jobs and GDP.
Whilst much media attention has been focused on the ability of 
firms and households to service their debts, less attention has been 
paid to the flow and composition of new loans. The balance between 
new loans and repayments determines how much money is circulating 
in the economy. If new lending dries up but the existing loans contin-
ue to be serviced, the means of payment present in the economy re-
duces, since the principal on the loans is destroyed when repaid, un-
der banking rules of account. This dynamic is believed to have been 
responsible for the Great Depression of the 1930s. People found the 
depression hard to understand, since the workers, machines and ma-
terials were all still perfectly functional. It was as if the ghost in the 
machine had vanished. Nowadays, central banks are prepared to cre-
ate credit to compensate.
Credit markets have been strongly affected. UK households repaid 
a record £7 billion (net) of bank loans in April, following £3.8 billion in 
March with a further £4.6 billion in May, and real estate transactions, 
which account for the bulk of UK credit, were just 10% of their pre-
COVID count in May (BE 2020). Anticipating contraction The Bank has 
thus far increased its QE program by an enormous £300 billion at the 
time of writing (July 2020), increasing the stock of government bonds it 
holds to £745 billion, over 40% of the UK national debt. In the remain-
der of this article, I explain why such ‘money printing’ is the general 
form that any net ‘stimulus’ activity has to take, rather than through 
the government borrowing to spend. I then discuss implications of 
prospective stimulus activity of the burgeoning climate emergency.
Public understanding of these matters remains weak, not helped 
by economics texts portraying banks as ‘intermediaries’ passing 
money between lenders and borrowers, rather than creating credit. 
For example, see Williams and Turton (2014, ch. 5), who also state 
1 Speech to South Wales Chamber of Commerce, The Millenium Centre, Cardiff, Oc-
tober 23, 2012.
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that QE does not create money. The authors contradict themselves 
by saying that QE has maintained M4, the broad measure of money 
supply, when bank lending fell after 2008. The QE part of this con-
tradiction can be resolved if the government pays off the bonds and 
The Bank retires the funds received. It seems unlikely that this will 
actually happen however. In the meantime, QE is clearly expanding 
the money supply.
2 Why Fiscal Stimulus Cannot be Financed by Bond Issues
Many commentators apparently believe that government deficits 
must be financed by selling bonds, and that therefore if the gov-
ernment wants to stimulate the economy by spending more, it must 
sell more bonds. This overlooks the fact that bonds are purchased 
using existing money, not new credit. Thus, every pound that goes 
towards purchasing bonds is a pound that is not being invested 
elsewhere. Necessarily, no new purchasing power is created, and 
therefore additional bond issues do not counteract monetary con-
traction taking place through falling bank loan volume. This is the 
lesson of Japan’s apparent failure to use fiscal policy to boost output 
following the collapse of its land value bubble in the 1990s. These 
points are argued convincingly, both theoretically and empirical-
ly, by Werner (2005). 
For example, the UK’s “Green New Deal” group argued for a pack-
age including green infrastructure spending financed by bond is-
sues, repeating their call in the wake of COVID-19 (GNDG 2008). The 
TUC amongst others have also called for government spending to in-
crease “given the low cost of borrowing”, seemingly unaware of any 
crowding-out problem. A common argument is that only government 
spending can stimulate demand in a recession, as monetary policy 
to expand bank lending is ‘pushing on a string’. It remains the case, 
however, that new government bonds are not bought with new bank 
credit. So to the extent that fiscal deficits are financed by bond issues, 
government borrowing competes for existing (and declining) liquid 
funds in the hands of pension funds and other investors.
The upshot is clearly that fiscal and monetary policy are not, con-
trary to what central bankers routinely profess, independent. The 
viewpoint typical of financial sector actors, including ratings agen-
cies, that governments should not print money to finance expendi-
tures (‘monetise the deficit’) arguably aligns with the interests of 
the financial sector to control the supply of money and debt. This in-
terest has recently crystallised into arrangements such as central 
bank independence and diplomatic agreements such as that in the 
Maastricht Treaty not to monetise deficits. This situation may help 
explain why convoluted procedures such as QE are devised to do so 
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when necessary. Central bank independence is itself dubious howev-
er, when the government appoints the governor and can veto its key 
decisions, as under the Bank of England Act 1998.2
3 Why Debt Monetisation Should not be Done by QE
QE involves the central bank buying government bonds and other as-
sets including company bonds, on the ‘secondary’ market, meaning 
bonds that have been auctioned by the government previously. For ex-
ample, it involves buying gilts3 held by pension funds, with the latter 
receiving deposits in their bank accounts in return. Since The Bank 
is publicly owned, this means the public sector is effectively print-
ing money to buy back its debt (‘debt monetisation’). 
The problems with QE include firstly that it is regressive; because 
it raises asset prices it benefits owners of bonds and shares, who tend 
to be well off. Persons with property also benefit through lower inter-
est payments on mortgages, and the effects of this on land values as 
reflected in house prices. The Bank itself reported that the top 5% 
of households by financial assets held 40% of them, with most house-
holds owning little or none. Asset-holding households gained an es-
timated £600 billion from £325 billion of purchases in the first wave 
of QE (BE 2012). Secondly, QE is strategically blind, since there is 
no control over where the money that is printed ultimately ends up. 
Those selling their bonds might use the money to buy more bonds, 
shares, land, property or related financial products. Mostly these 
will be trades in existing assets, not generating new goods or ser-
vices. A third problem is that low interest rates, though they lower 
debt service costs, discourage bank lending by making it less profit-
able. Finally, there are adverse effects on pension funds, motivating 
the abandonment of defined benefit pensions, undermining people’s 
financial security in retirement.
Given its demonstrable ills, QE should not be continued if there 
are viable alternative forms of monetising deficits. There are at least 
three. One is that The Bank simply credits government accounts as 
necessary. Equivalently, the treasury may order The Bank to credit 
non-government accounts as appropriate for its purchases. Alterna-
tively, The Bank can buy government bonds with new credit. Finally, 
the government could make loan contracts with banks to finance its 
deficits. These would result in fresh credit being issued, unlike sales 
2 See in particular the extensive “reserve powers” of the Government under the 
section 19 of the Act: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/11/section/19.
3 Gilts (gilt-edged securities) are UK government liabilities offering investors regu-
lar payments before maturity. See DMO (nd).
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of bonds in the primary market. The contracts could be made non-
tradable to prevent them becoming, as bonds are, objects of specula-
tion (Werner 2014). It is worth noting in passing that as an issuer of 
the currency via The Bank, the government cannot be in a position 
not to pay debts denominated in sterling. It is therefore strange to 
suggest, as the current governor of The Bank has,4 that the govern-
ment might somehow run out of cash. The usual objection to monetis-
ing a deficit is that it is inflationary. This apparently applies in full to 
QE, however, so is out of place in a discussion of alternative methods. 
Perhaps one reason that The Bank has not pursued open debt 
monetisation is that it is against the terms of the Maastricht Trea-
ty, the economic cornerstone of the EU project. Should it continue 
to be politically necessary to avoid open monetisation by The Bank, 
it is not clear why the option outlined by Werner (2014) would be ob-
jectionable.
4 Why We Do not Simply Need ‘Recovery’  
of the Previous Economy
In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, environmentalists were 
hoping to see reduced greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. They were 
severely disappointed. Carbon emissions fell only for one year before 
continuing a relentless upward trajectory (Peters et al. 2019), with 
policy-makers’ attention fixated on the economy.
Similarly, many progressive commentators have been speculating 
that a different economy might emerge after COVID-19 lockdown. 
We have to realise that economic ‘recovery’ conceived only in terms 
of stimulus instruments (the budgetary measures we have been dis-
cussing) means increasing greenhouse emissions again. It was no 
accident they grew alongside GDP. This is because there is limited 
substitutability of fossil fuel energy for renewables, given the much 
higher “power density” of the former (Giampietro, Mayumi 2010). 
That is, to achieve the same power output to the rest of society, re-
newable energy infrastructure uses far more land and labour, mak-
ing fossil fuel use inevitable for most industrial applications. Whilst 
it seems possible, then, to reactivate the economy by monetised gov-
ernment spending without any structural planning, this is not what 
should happen given the imperative to reduce global GHG emissions. 
Le Quéré et al. (2020) estimate that following the large fall in 
economic activity by April when economic activity was largely con-
4 Interview with The World Tomorrow, Sky News, June 22 2020. https://news.sky.
com/story/coronavirus-governor-says-bank-of-england-saved-britain-from-
effective-insolvency-12012369.
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fined to essentials, if economies operated at their previous intensity 
by mid-June, there would be a 4% annual reduction in GHGs. There 
would be a 7% fall if certain restrictions remained until the end of 
the year, comparable to what would be needed to meet the aims of 
the UN Paris Agreement on climate change.
In the medium term, energy supply constraints following ‘peak 
oil’ reinforce these considerations. Conventional crude oil, which has 
more favourable energetic properties than unconventional hydrocar-
bons, has been static since around 2006 (Bentley, Mushalik, Wang 
2020), suggesting an imminent decline. To simply ‘restart’ the econo-
my and recover its previous intensity would, it seems, squander much 
of the remaining higher quality energy resources on inessential con-
sumption.
5 A Post-COVID Social Ecological Policy Package
There is limited space here to expound an appropriate response to 
the ecological crisis. Bardsley (2012) proposed a policy package in 
detail which I now summarise. To prevent a repeat of the 2009 expe-
rience, fossil fuel use needs to be constrained. This could be imposed 
by capping quantities of coal, oil and gas upstream, that is, requir-
ing fossil fuel companies to purchase emissions permits covering the 
carbon content of any fuel they sell. An equitable way of doing this 
is for the emissions rights (permits) to be allocated to the popula-
tion, either individually (a policy proposal named ‘cap and share’) or 
in trust (‘cap and dividend’), so that when permits are sold the pop-
ulation acquires the revenue. This would compensate them finan-
cially for price increases deriving from energy scarcity, and house-
holds with the lowest emissions would benefit the most. See Comhar 
(2008) for an evaluation applying the E3ME model of Barker (1999), 
plus Kunkel and Kammen (2011) and Bardsley, Schnepf and Buechs 
(2017) for illustration of redistributive effects of the policy applied 
to specific sectors. 
Green spending is necessary, financed directly by the central bank 
or with loan contracts with private banks, and has potential to pro-
vide many jobs. This should include extensive thermal insulation up-
grades both for commercial and residential property, in addition to 
development of renewable energy infrastructure. Agroecological and 
other land management schemes should be developed and deployed 
to combine enhanced carbon storage in soils and biomass with im-
proved food security. Biochar techniques for example appear prom-
ising, if complex.
In a future defined increasingly by resource and ecological limits 
to growth, extreme inequality will become increasingly abhorrent as 
the position of the worst off becomes more precarious. A substantial 
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land (site) value tax would be a powerful tool for redistribution, and 
would also help to reduce burgeoning housing costs by eroding specu-
lative gains from landholdings. A shift of the revenue base away from 
taxes on labour and capital also makes sense to encourage produc-
tive activity, and this would not exacerbate GHG emissions given an 
overall cap. Spending on public health and social care systems, which 
should be more resource efficient and equitable than private sector 
counterparts because of the sharing of resources across the popula-
tion, will also serve to alleviate inequality. Efficiency should not be 
over-emphasised however, as having excess capacity has proved cru-
cial to the ability of health systems to respond to the crisis.
Debt relief should be introduced if household mortgage debts 
prove intolerable. This would be problematic if it were to reward ir-
responsible borrowing, however. A solution could be for each house-
hold to receive vouchers which can be exchanged for debt, with the 
loan issuer exchanging the voucher for central bank money, allevi-
ating bank losses. If the household does not have debt the voucher 
could instead be exchanged for domestic thermal upgrades or re-
newable energy bonds. Since this relief scheme would benefit the 
banks this measure should be conditional, for example on reintro-
duction of credit controls to give government more power to direct 
economic activity.
A universal basic income could be partly constituted by the debt 
relief and carbon revenue elements of the package but could be sup-
plemented as necessary with government spending. This concept 
could be extended to one of universal basic services encompassing 
minimum standards of energy and food provision.5
It must be admitted that such a program seems very unlikely to 
happen. However, given the alignment of the current economic sys-
tem towards ecologically disastrous outcomes, a package that would 
actually operate in the other direction must inevitably be radical. 
The objective should be to find the least improbable set of measures 
that would work to constrain and reduce emissions, whilst maintain-
ing welfare in an increasingly resource-constrained world. Compare 
it to the UK government’s actual response: massive money printing 
for QE, loan schemes for business, including loans to big business un-
derwritten by the treasury with few conditions attached, a small in-
crease in benefits, temporary income / employment support schemes 
for those in work, grants for home insulation which benefit property 
owners, some mortgage relief but no rent relief except for business. 
There are to be no new controls on GHG emissions. Further infra-
structure spending has been announced but it is not yet clear if this 
5 I owe this observation to Brian Davey (personal correspondence).
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adds to pre-COVID manifesto commitments.6 The regressive nature of 
QE deserves repeating. BE (2012) estimated that the first wave of QE 
gave an average transfer of £10,000 per UK household but reaped on-
ly by the richest 50%. It seems the UK is largely helping the better off.
Perhaps the main problem with the package proposed is the dif-
ficulty of implementing hard controls on fossil fuel use unilaterally. 
It might be possible to devise a way of doing this via carbon tariffs. 
But it would be difficult to drive emissions down year on year, as Le 
Quéré et al. (2020), along with the mainstream of climate scientists, 
deem necessary, without international cooperation.
6 Conclusions
Printing money to buy back bonds (QE) is regressive and strategical-
ly blind. A social ecological stimulus would, in contrast, openly mone-
tise the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement without raising asset 
prices, and strategically direct credit towards green infrastructure, 
agroecology, and essential goods and services, including health and 
social care. Curbing greenhouse emissions is however, inconsistent 
with maintaining current levels of consumerism, so the overall aim 
should not be a general upturn in output. The economic response 
to COVID should rather take place within a framework of hard con-
straints on greenhouse gas emissions. Suitable policies exist, but 
plausibly require international cooperation to be implemented. In 
the absence of such a framework, government spending packages 
should be targeted, at provision of essential goods and services on a 
universal basis, development of post-fossil-fuel infrastructure, envi-
ronmental and agroecological schemes. 
6 An overview of government-funded schemes responding to the COVID crisis is giv-
en by Deloitte (2020). The overall stimulus effect depends how they are financed, which 
is not outlined in the document.
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